Gibson v. Berryhill, 6 decided the same day as Preiser, the Court noted in dictum that the traditional exhaustion requirement might apply where the litigant's rights under section 1983 were completely protected during the state administrative process. 7 These recent developments suggest that this is an appropriate time to re-evaluate the exhaustion principle in section 1983 cases. This comment will focus on exhaustion in section 1983 cases to determine whether a relaxed requirement is necessary or appropriate in terms of federalism, sound judicial administration, and the purposes of section 1983. The comment first examines the nature of the exhaustion requirement and the rationale for its application to state administrative rather than judicial remedies. Next, it considers relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases, and examines the purposes of section 1983 in light of the rationale for exhdustion. The comment concludes that relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases is not necessary to satisfy considerations of federalism or the purposes of section 1983, and suggests an alternative exhaustion requirement for section 1983 cases modeled on section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
I. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

A. The Doctrine
The federal courts follow a general rule that an administrative action-by either a state or a federal agency-will not be reviewed unless the plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative remedies." The courts recognize, however, several exceptions to this rule. First, the administrative agency must have jurisdiction over the controversy.' 0 For example, a federal court will not require an interstate carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to exhaust its administrative remedies within a municipal agency that has no jurisdiction over the carrier." Second, the courts do not require exhaustion of remedies that are judicial in nature .' Third, the doctrine does not require exhaustion of unnecessary, inadequate, or futile administrative remedies.' 3 Exhaustion is not required, for example, where the agency 10 In Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562 (1919) , Justice Brandeis distinguished between relief sought on the basis of an excessive rate or a discriminatory practice and an act in excess of an agency's statutory powers: "If plaintiff had sought relief against a rate or practice alleged to be unjust because unreasonably high or discriminatory, the remedy must have been sought primarily by proceedings before the Commission. .... But plaintiff does not contend that 75 cents is an unreasonably high rate or that it is discriminatory or that there was mere error in the action of the Commission. The contention is that the Commission has exceeded its statutory powers; and that, hence, the order is void. In such a case the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the Commission."
11 See Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 357 U.S. 77 (1958) . 12 The distinction between administrative and judicial remedies for the purposes of exhaustion rests on the fact that an administrative determination does not ordinarily have the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a judicial determination. See text and notes at notes 67-73 infra. Significantly, it is the character of the remedy rather than that of the tribunal which is dispositive. A state court may be empowered to act administratively, and in such instances exhaustion of administrative remedies will be required. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908) . Cf. Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U. S. 134 (1914) , in which the Vermont Constitution provided that the state supreme court could act only judicially. The Supreme Court held that state law was controlling in regard to the powers of the state court and that the state court's action would be judicial despite the attempt of the legislature to invest it with legislative power. Because the court's judicial determination would have res judicata effect, exhaustion was not required. See also 1 W. BARRON 
& A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAanCE AND PROCEDURE § 64 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
Prentis concerned federal judicial review of state rate orders, which was subsequently limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958) , which states:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and, (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing, and, (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 13 The Supreme Court of the United States recently noted that "the basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 US. 84, 37 (1972) . Because the relative importance of these factors and the capacities of the particular agency involved will vary from case to case, the exhaustion doctrine must be applied with an "understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved." 
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has taken action to deny the litigant access to the appeal process, 1 4 or where the agency does not have the authority to grant the requested relief. 15 Finally, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the litigant will be subject to irreparable injury due to lengthy administrative procedures that fail to provide interim relief. 16 
B. The Rationale
The requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies continues as a well-settled doctrine of federal judicial administration. (Ist Cir. 1970) , in which the court found exhaustion not to be required where a school superintendent attempted to deny a teacher access to the administrative procedures established by state law. Denial of access may be accomplished in this manner simply by dilatory administrative inaction. As one commentator has noted: "The big discretionary power all along the line may be the seemingly omnipresent power to do nothing." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TExcr § 401 (3d ed.
1972).
15 See Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943) , in which the rate orders of which plaintiffs complained, if made, would have intruded into an area of exclusive federal regulation. Compare L. JAM' supra note 9 at 437-38, with 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at § 20.02.
16 In Oklahoma Natural Gas v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290 (1923) , the state remedy in question was administrative but the Court held that excessive delay, compounded by a refusal to grant a supersedeas writ, would nullify the otherwise applicable exhaustion requirement where a constitutional issue was raised. Justice Holmes stressed the fact that the company had "done all that they can under the state law to get relief and cannot get it." Id. at 293. Significantly, the Court indicated in Oklahoma Natural Gas that it would look not only at the state exhaustion scheme as it existed in statute, but also at how it functioned in fact. The requirement that exhaustion of state administrative remedies be predicated on the availability in fact of interim relief was reaffirmed in Pacific Telephone Co. v. KuyKendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924 18 Dean Landis said of this dimension of the administrative-judicial relationship that "one can ask little more than to have issues decided by those who are best equipped for the task." J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at 153. The role of the courts is to determine whether the agency's fact-finding, rule-making and enforcement processes conform to legal requirements; ordinarily courts are equipped to deal with technical issues only through a seriously inefficient reallocation of judicial resources.
19 Justice Black considered a related aspect of this problem in his discussion of comity in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) :
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control, over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which thert is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and vides a state agency with an opportunity to correct its own errors, thus reducing the likelihood of resort to the federal courts for resolution of the dispute. 20 Exhaustion also promotes judicial economy by providing the federal court with an opportunity to profit from the agency's expertise, its experience in the administration of its own statutes and regulations, and the agency's ability to generate a more thorough and relevant factual record, especially in areas of complex regulation.
21
Since the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of state court 22 and federal agency determinations 23 do not attach to a state adminisNational Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. Although it is frequently asserted that the Civil Rights Acts and other Reconstruction statutes changed the nature of American federalism and expanded the role of the federal courts, the question remains as to the precise extent of this change. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 288-39 (1972 Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970 ). An alternative approach has been noted by Professor Jaffe, who suggests that an emphasis on the complexity of the issues and the expertise of the agency "permits false implications and creates damaging expectations with respect to those agencies it does purport to describe." Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1183, 1184 (1973 In Monroe, the Court held that a plaintiff in a section 1983 case was not required to exhaust state judicial remedies. 27 The decision is ever, the constitutionality of the underlying statute, the fairness of the administrative procedure employed, and the agency's jurisdiction to act. These factors may present the opportunity for judicial nullification of the agency's determination even where a statute seems to preclude judicial review. See L. JAFFE, supra note 9, at 153-55.
24 365 U.S. 167 (1961 REV. 1285 REV. , 1287 REV. (1953 .
Because of the limited scope given section 1983, Professor Chafee was able to base his argument for new civil rights legislation on the ineffectiveness of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, describing it as an "unintelligible statute" and a "bent and blunted sword. 299, 326 (1941) . The Monroe briefs show that the plaintiffs cited Lane for the proposition that availability of state judicial remedies was not a bar to a federal suit under section 1983. Petitioners' Brief at 13, 15-16. There is no reference in the respondents' brief to the exhaustion issue, indicating that their exhaustion argument had been given up by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. The only plausible reason for the Court's failure to cite Lane is that it chose to state the issue in broader terms than the earlier case permitted, so as to encompass all state remedies within its statement of the exhaustion principle: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) . Although Monroe itself concerned only judicial remedies and the broader language used by the Court is only dictum, it is dictum which has successfully obscured the necessary distinction between administrative and judicial remedies in subsequent cases. § 22-19 (1961) , the State Superintendent of Public Instruction was required to hold a hearing regarding allegations of racial imbalance upon complaint by fifty residents or 10 percent of a school district (whichever was lesser). The State Superintendent was then required to decide whether the allegations were substantially correct and request the Attorney General, if he also so found, to file a suit. Any decision of the Superintendent would be reviewable by the courts, but the determination by the Attorney General would presumably be unreviewable because of his prosecutorial discretion. The effect of this process was to force the plaintiff to follow, at considerable public and
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The University of Chicago Law Review Harlan was unable to distinguish convincingly Monroe in McNeese. Three modes of distinction were available to him. The first was based on the type of relief sought; in Monroe the federal court had intervened only to provide damages, whereas plaintiffs in McNeese sought injunctive relief. Harlan asserted that "a sound respect for the independence of state action required the federal equity court to stay its hand." 373 U.S. 668, 677 (1963) ; the majority was not convinced by this reasoning. The second distinction wa the one he attempted to raise in Damico in order to rewrite the holding in McNeese: the adequacy of the state remedy. Since Harlan did not share the majority's view that the remedy was inadequate in fact, he was in no position in McNeese to argue for that narrower holding. The third distinction was one that escaped even Harlan's circumspection: the conceptual and practical difference between administrative and judicial remedies. 34 389 U.S. 416 (1967) . 35 California did not argue the distinction between administrative and judicial remedies, but attempted instead to distinguish McNeese on the theory that the remedy involved in McNeese was entirely a state remedy whereas the remedy in Damico was a hybrid federalstate remedy entitled to particular deference. Respondent's Motion to Affirm at 5-6. Only Justice Harlan was persuaded by the state's argument. He argued in dissent that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's supervision of state welfare programs made federal judicial intervention inappropriate. 389 U.S. 416, 419 (1967) . What Harlan failed to understand was that the futility of exhaustion was only enhanced by the failure of the federal executive to exercise its statutory duty with respect to the supervision of state welfare administration where state regulations may be inconsistent with federal law. 36 392 U.S. 309 (1969).
tional. 8 7 Finally, Houghton v. Shafer 38 was a suit by a state prisoner to recover his law books, which were confiscated under prison regulations. The court of appeals affirmed without opinion the dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In reversing, the Supreme Court explicitly noted the probable futility of an administrative appeal to the state Attorney General, who had submitted to the Court an opinion that the prison regulations were valid and had been properly applied to the prisoner. 39 The Second Circuit has rejected the view that these four opinions abolished the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases. In Eisen v. Eastman, 40 Judge Friendly argued that exhaustion is still required in section 1983 cases and that these four cases come under the traditional limitations to the exhaustion doctrine covering inadequate or futile administrative remedies. 41 In McNeese the Court held that the avail-
37
In a footnote, the Court stated that a section 1983 plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to require the convening of a three-judge court. Id. at 312 n.4. The introduction of the three-judge court requirement narrows rather than codifies the Court's previous statement of the law. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, a three-judge court must be convened when an injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining an officer engaged in such enforcement or in the enforcement of an administrative determination made thereunder; the injunction must be sought on the ground of unconstitutionality. Apart from the fact that this statement does not codify the Court's earlier holdings, it is unsatisfactory because there is no reason to assume that it limits section 1983 in a way that is relevant to the statutory intent. Federal jurisdiction in section 1983 cases is usually founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which gives to federal courts "original jurisdiction" in civil rights cases; under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, there is no requirement that the state officer be acting in the enforcement of a state statute or that his action violate the Constitution. What relationship do these additional barriers have to the language of section 1983, which makes no distinction between violations of federal law and violations of the federal Constitution nor between wrongs under color of state statute and wrongs accomplished by ultra vires acts of state officers? 88 392 U.S. 639 (1968) . 39 Again, the Court's opinion used language that was broader than necessary. The state Attorney General certified that the prison authorities' action was in strict compliance with rules enforced throughout the Commonwealth. Moreover, the prisoner had attempted to appeal to higher administrative authority and had been told to "leave well enough alone." rd. at 640. The Court conceded that the official policy of the Commonwealth was being challenged and that nothing could be gained from requiring exhaustion, but noted: "In any event resort to these remedies is unnecessary in light of our [earlier] 45 The willingness of the Court to treat habeas corpus and section 1983 cases as fungible was underscored by the procedural posture of the case: the plaintiffs had previously brought a section 1983 action which was denied after a full hearing. The writ of habeas corpus was sought on the same facts, only to be held by the Supreme Court as entitled to treatment as a section 1983 case. Chief Justice Burger was understandably disturbed by this sleight of hand. See id. at 252-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting Gibson v. Berryhill, 51 a section 1983 action that sought a federal injunction against state license revocation proceedings because of unconstitutional bias in the licensing board, was decided the same day as Preiser. The Court held exhaustion unnecessary where the administrative board was challenged as unconstitutionally composed, but suggested that a liberalized exhaustion principle might be inappropriate where the state has provided an administrative remedy by which "the individual charged is to be deprived of nothing until the completion of that proceeding .... -52 Although this statement is dictum, it represents a potentially important qualification of the section 1983 exhaustion rule, and a new approach that would re-emphasize the adequacy of the state remedy. [41:537 to state administrative remedies. A reading of the commentary and cases under section 1983 suggests that application of the special exhaustion principle developed in Monroe and its progeny to state administrative actions is justified by the fundamental character of the rights protected by that statute 5 The underlying proposition is that the only practical device to insure protection of these rights is circumvention of all state administrative remedies in favor of immediate federal adjudication.
6 Even assuming that it is possible both to define fundamental rights 57 and to show that the rights protected by section 1983 are categorically fundamental rights,-5 immediate federal adjudication through a relaxed exhaustion requirement is not necessary to provide immediate protection for these rights. 59
Presumably section 1983 claims could be litigated in state courts although they would be subject to removal to a federal forum. R v. 567, 570 (1970) . It is difficult to see how immediate federal adjudication is better designed to safeguard fundamental federal rights than an approach that distinguishes between adequate and inadequate state administrative remedies. See text and notes at notes 67-73 infra. 57 In fact, the definition is not analytically easy. The cases generally make no attempt to define fundamental rights, perhaps with the view that, like obscene works, a judge will know them when he sees them. Traditionally, the courts have held that equity will not intervene to protect personal rights. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888 The relevant inquiry in determining whether exhaustion is required should be the adequacy of a particular remedy in providing the desired relief-in this case immediate protection of section 1983 rights-rather than the character of the rights asserted.6
0 If the primary concern of the Court is immediate protection of section 1983 rights, complete relaxation of the exhaustion requirement is unnecessary. Exhaustion of state administrative remedies will not interfere with the exercise of section 1983 rights in those cases in which the deprivation does not take place until the conclusion of the state administrative process."' Although the deputy wardens and the reluctance of state legislatures to spend the funds needed to clean up horrible conditions in the prisons." Aldisert, supra note 2, at 565-66. This conclusion about prisons is expandable in two directions. First, it is applicable to other spheres of administration insofar as poorly paid officers and clerks exercise discretionary power throughout the government. Second, it is applicable where equitable relief is sought: an injunction is subject to its own peculiar infirmities as a rule of law addressed to individuals and of limited precedential value. As such, it is particularly susceptible to a "law of the case" analysis after the manner of argument made by Southern officials regrouping after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . See Frankel, The Alabama Lawyer, 1954 Lawyer, -1964 Has the Official Organ Atrophied?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1243 REv. , 1249 REv. -50 (1964 .
The impact of an injunction depends on the structure of the administrative machinery at which the injunction is aimed, the role and influence of the particular addressees within the machinery, and the outside political pressures in favor of or against the injunction. 134, 140, 144 (1971) . Since an injunction is legally binding only upon the persons actually addressed, the effectiveness of the injunction as a reform mechanism wiU depend in part on its nonmandatory collateral force. In an organization that has many power centers and little administrative integration, the effects of an injunction against a single power center will have minimal effects elsewhere. 60 The Supreme Court noted this principle in the context of federal administrative remedies in W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967) , holding that exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required even in the adjudication of constitutional claims if the development of a factual record would aid the courts in resolving the dispute and the administrative procedures are fair and adequate. See also A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the court said "[t]he governing concept as expressed in both judicial doctrine and statute may require even constitutional claims to be determined on the administrative record when the administrative procedure is fair and adequate for presentation of material facts." Id. at 861.
61 An example is a license revocation process where the individual charged with malpractice or abuse of his license is allowed to practice until the completion of the administrative proceeding and thus is deprived of nothing until the administrative process has run its course. The Supreme Court noted this possibility in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973) , and indicated that the licensing revocation procedure in that case was of this type.
If complete interim relief is defined as delaying the deprivation of federal rights until the conclusion of the administrative process, it is possible to argue that no cause of action exists under section 1983 during the interim period. This comment, however, takes the generally accepted position that the federal cause of action exists after the initial administrative action, but that adjudication in the federal courts can be postponed until administrative remedies are exhausted.
Court held in Monroe 2 that the federal remedy was supplementary to the state remedy, the failure to require exhaustion of state remedies in that case took place in a context in which the deprivation of federal rights-accomplished through the misconduct of local police 63 -had already occurred and could not be avoided through interim state relief. The only method to achieve immediate protection of federal rights in Monroe was a state court or federal court action, and the plaintiff in Monroe had a right to choose a federal forum.
There is one group of cases in which even the availability of complete interim relief during the state administrative process will not provide an adequate administrative remedy. If a section 1983 plaintiff can prove bad faith harassment on the part of state administrative officials, the state administrative remedy is inadequate and a relaxed exhaustion requirement is appropriate. Although the cost of exhausting state administrative remedies is usually not sufficient to make the administrative remedy inadequate, 64 immediate protection of federal rights requires a relaxed exhaustion requirement when the plaintiff is able to prove that the state is using the cost of administrative appeals to harass or deter those seeking to enforce section 1983 rights. 5 The administrative remedy in cases of bad faith harassment is adequate in theory but inadequate in practice. 66 02 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) . 63 In Monroe, a Black family alleged that Chicago police officers broke into their apartment at 5:45 A.M., woke the parents and forced them to stand naked while the children were routed from their beds and herded into the living room. The plaintiffs further alleged that they were subjected to physical and verbal abuse, that their apartment was ransacked and that the father was detained on "open" charges for ten hours. He was neither brought before a magistrate nor advised of his procedural rights. He was later released without being charged. Id. at 169.
64 In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938), Justice Brandeis stated the general principle that mere unrecoupable litigation expense did not constitute the type of injury which would require circumvention of administrative remedies. As Professor Jaffe has written: "The expense and woe of litigation are risks to which whatever the modes of justice-and though one may win in the end-we are all subject." L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 428.
65 An analogous case was presented by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) , in which plaintiffs sought a federal injunction against a state criminal prosecution. The Court held that an injunction would not be routinely granted and required that the circumstances of -a case must "establish the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention. " Id. at 48 (1971) . In holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet this standard, the Court indicated that the standard could be met by either a single prosecutionmade in bad faith or a series of repeated prosecutions. Id. at 49.
60 A state agency may engage in bad faith harassment by placing unreasonable conditions upon the provision of services. For instance, it may adhere to a very strict "law of the case" approach to administration and require a client to follow a lengthy series of administrative appeals to determine his rights when, by any fair standard, the rights of
B. Federal Protection of Fundamental Federal Rights
The argument has frequently been made that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required in section 1988 cases because federal rights are entitled to enforcement in a federal forum.
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This argument is based on the proposition that federal courts should not decline the exercise of federal jurisdiction simply because another forum is available to enforce the asserted rights. 08 167, 183 (1961) , established that the plaintiff is effectively granted the right to choose his forum under section 1983. The rationale for this choice of forum is the potential res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of state court judgments. If the plaintiff is required to sue first in state court, he will not then be able to bring his section 1983 action in federal court insofar as the state court judgment creates collateral estoppel effects. See Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134, 138 (1914) . The same argument does not apply with regard to administrative remedies because there the specter of res judicata or collateral estoppel does not appear; the only cost of requiring exhaustion is the delay involved in any such process. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908) . This distinction was applied to section 1983 cases in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939) .
60 See text and notes at notes 54-60 supra & note 71 infra. Different problems may arise where the exhaustion issue concerns the exhaustion of federal administrative remedies, because of the greater weight given the determination of a federal agency's findings. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) . See also Judge Wright's discussion of exhaustion of federal administrative remedies in Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 354-61 (D.C. Cir. 1972 Violence is to be expected under such circumstances. Violence, sporadic, emotional, sudden, riotous, turbulent, we were to expect. But the possibility of organized, armed, trained, drilled, sworn bands of murderers, who should murder for political effect, came not within the scope of my imagination. Yet the proofs are glaring as the sun at noonday or the stars in a moonless and cloudless night that this state of affairs has existed and does exist to a large extent among men who are bound by the highest honorable obligation known to soldiers, a parole of honor, to remain at peace .... I repeat, sir, that this is war. And that the facts known to us would justify ... the President to use the United States Army in the suppression of armed rebellion and the establishment of law and order. The bill ... proposes no such violent remedy as this. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 339 (1871).
provide a federal remedy where the state remedy was available in theory but not in practice. 75 One must conclude from this statement of legislative purpose that Congress intended to deny state authorities the opportunity to redress harms in this area only where the state is unable or unwilling to provide a fair and efficacious remedy. 78 Although the state judicial remedy is always inefficacious because its res judicata and collateral estoppel effects jeopardize the litigant's right to a federal forum, the state administrative remedy is subject to no such infirmity and its adequacy must be judged by its merits.
In the Court's view, Congress was least concerned with nullifying state laws; its quarrel was not with state statutes then on the books, but with their lack of even-handed enforcement. 77 Discriminatory state statutes, however, present the strongest case for not requiring exhaustion; where the statute is clear, administrative procedures are unlikely to provide any significant relief. Even there, however, categorical rejection of exhaustion is inappropriate. Assuming a state statute is inconsistent with federal law, exhaustion may be appropriate for the purpose of developing a factual record, receiving the benefit of agency expertise in the administration of its statutes and rules, and allowing the agency to limit the application of the statute consistently with federal law. Only where a factual record is irrelevant and the statute is both facially unconstitutional and incapable of any appropriate construction is exhaustion without value.
The second and third congressional purposes-to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy is inadequate on its face or in practicerequire application of the exhaustion principle for their fulfillment. If the threshold for federal intervention is the inadequacy of the state remedy, it is unreasonable to foreclose a state officer with the willingness and authority to correct the errors of his subordinates from doing so. If Congress sought to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy is not adequate in fact, it follows that the legislative intent requires adequate remedies to be exhausted. The third element of congressional purpose requires that the federal court inquire not only into the state remedy's adequacy as it appears from statute and regulation, but also 75 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961) . 76 The legislative history indicates that Congress was primarily concerned with abuses its adequacy in practice. Rather than precluding exhaustion, this element suports the exhaustion requirement, since there is no reason to distinguish between adequate and inadequate remedies if the exhaustion principle is to be abrogated in all section 1983 cases.
In short, the legislative intent was not to create a complete substitute for all state remedies, but rather to provide a federal remedy where state remedies are inadequate on their face or in practice, or where a state law, as applied, is inconsistent with federal law. In both situations cases can arise that require exhaustion for their proper resolution.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE ExHAUSInON REQUIREMENT
Complete relaxation of the exhaustion of state administrative remedies requirement in section 1983 cases is unnecessary to insure immediate protection of federal rights or to guarantee the litigant's right to a federal forum. A modified exhaustion requirement, modeled on section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 7 9 can maximize effective protection of federal rights and minimize the unnecessary dislocation of legitimate state administration.
A. Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA provides for judicial review of final agency action except to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review or commit agency action to agency discretion. Section 704 of the Act provides:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority. 80 This section of the APA differs from the judicial doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in two important ways. First, under section 704, a litigant is not required to exhaust intra-agency appeals unless the right to appeal is given by statute or agency rule. This provision places upon the legislature or administritive agency the burden of establishing an appeals mechanism before exhaustion can be required. Second, and more important, section 704 requires that the effect of preliminary agency determination be suspended while the appeal is pending. This requirement transforms a discretionary equitable remedy into a mandatory legal remedy, and thus effectively protects a litigant from even interim deprivations of his rights.
B. Application of the Section 704 Model to Section 1983 Cases
A modified section 704 approach to exhaustion of state administrative remedies in section 1983 cases can provide immediate protection of fundamental federal rights, guarantee the litigant's choice of a federal forum, and achieve efficient allocation of judicial resources. Using section 704 as a basic model, the federal courts should require exhaustion of state administrative remedies where: (1) an orderly system of appeals is provided by statute or agency rule; (2) the administrative remedies are adequate; and (3) the system of appeals provides full interim relief by protecting the litigant's rights under section 1983 until the administrative process has been concluded.
A presumption of adequacy should exist in favor of the administrative appeal process, and exhaustion should be required unless the litigant rebuts that presumption. Where the litigant seeks to preserve the status quo, the availability of complete interim relief creates a strong presumption in favor of the adequacy of the remedy, but proof of bad faith harassment would rebut the presumption. Where the litigant seeks to alter the status quo, the analysis is more complicated, because the agency can employ the appeals mechanism to deny federal rights. If, for example, the litigant's object is integration of a racially segregated school district, a lengthy administrative appeals process would frustrate compliance with federal standards. The presumption of adequacy is weaker in this group of cases because of the agency's possible interest in delay, and the presumption should be rebuttable by proof of irreparable injury, interminable delay, excessive expense, or bad faith harassment.
CONCLUSION
Application of a modified section 704 approach to the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases is based on a simple principle: where state administrative remedies are fair and adequate and provide complete interim relief, no legitimate interest is served through a relaxation of the exhaustion requirement. The modified section 704 approach provides immediate protection for section 1983 rights, guarantees the litigant's right to a federal forum, and achieves the legislative purposes of section 1983 with a minimum of interference with legitimate state
